Sunday, December 13, 2009
Christmas Break
Okay, so are we reading the Intro to The Philosophy of History over Christmas? I remember Dr. Davis and Mr. York talking about it.
Friday, October 16, 2009
The Self-Sublating of Finitude
What would the implications of this view be for the possibility of artificial intelligence?
Monday, September 21, 2009
Hegel and Schopenhauer
I figured this wouldn't be a productive point to bring up in class, but it would make a nice blog post.
It struck me through the chapter that Hegel's Force seems a lot like Schopenhauer's Will (note: I have only experienced Schopenhauer through secondary sources, Dr. Anderson, and Nietzsche, so I might be off). There's an inner secret world (world-as-will), and a world of appearance (world-as-representation), but the thing that observes force and makes it manifest is actually force itself (just as we, for Schopenhauer, are manifestations of the will). Force and its expression are one, just as the will and its appearance are two sides of the same coin. I also don't think it would be unfair to draw a parallel between Schopenhauer's use of "Platonic" Ideas and Hegel's Laws.
I have no doubt that I've misread Hegel, misread Schopenhauer, or perhaps both, but it's an interesting thought.
It struck me through the chapter that Hegel's Force seems a lot like Schopenhauer's Will (note: I have only experienced Schopenhauer through secondary sources, Dr. Anderson, and Nietzsche, so I might be off). There's an inner secret world (world-as-will), and a world of appearance (world-as-representation), but the thing that observes force and makes it manifest is actually force itself (just as we, for Schopenhauer, are manifestations of the will). Force and its expression are one, just as the will and its appearance are two sides of the same coin. I also don't think it would be unfair to draw a parallel between Schopenhauer's use of "Platonic" Ideas and Hegel's Laws.
I have no doubt that I've misread Hegel, misread Schopenhauer, or perhaps both, but it's an interesting thought.
Sunday, September 20, 2009
Just for the sake of using the blog...
Force and the understanding was the craziest thing I have ever read in my life. The part that really bothered me about the reading was that I felt like I understood where he went, at least for the first part of the section, but I never had any idea how he got there. It is really unfortunate that this section was twice as long and (at least) twice as hard because it seemed like he was talking about really interesting and important things. Somehow in 25 pages we got from "Things" to "The simple Infinity, or the absolute Notion, [which] may be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor interrupted by any difference; but rather is itself every difference, as also their suppression; it pulsates within itself but does not move , inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest." That is crazy. I don't have any idea how he got there in 25 pages. Also, How is Holy of Holies a void? I thought God lived there...
The thing that really blows my mind is that one guy wrote all of this stuff! If its this hard to understand, Hegel must have been some sort of divine prophet to have put all of this in words. Either that or he was the most insane man to ever live...
Unconditioned Universals
In the first paragraph of FatU, Hegel talks about the object of consciousness now being an "unconditioned universal." I'm not quite sure what he's talking about.
He first mentions such a thing back in §129: "From a sensuous being [the object] turned into a universal; but this universal, since it originates in the sensuous, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is not truly a self-identical universality at all, but one afflicted with an opposition; for this reason the universality splits into the extremes of singular individuality and universality, into the One of the properties, and the Also of 'free matters.' These pure determinatenesses seem to express the essential nature itself, but they are only a 'being-for-self' that is burdened with a 'being-for-another.' Since, however, both are essentially in a single unity, what we now have is unconditioned absolute universality, and consciousness here for the first time truly enters the realm of the Understanding."
So if we are to understand the unconditioned universal, that paragraph seems like the place to look, but I can't make much sense of it. It seems that since "conditioned" universality has to do with the senses, unconditioned universality must be non-sensuous. And this unconditioned universality somehow comes about by recognizing that being-for-self and being-for-another are part of a unity...
Wait, that makes sense, I think. Unconditioned means that we aren't making a distinction between "for self" and "for another," and thus we are unifying the in-itself and the for-us under one universal.
Any ideas? I kind of thought out loud, so I apologize if this post seemed disorganized.
He first mentions such a thing back in §129: "From a sensuous being [the object] turned into a universal; but this universal, since it originates in the sensuous, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is not truly a self-identical universality at all, but one afflicted with an opposition; for this reason the universality splits into the extremes of singular individuality and universality, into the One of the properties, and the Also of 'free matters.' These pure determinatenesses seem to express the essential nature itself, but they are only a 'being-for-self' that is burdened with a 'being-for-another.' Since, however, both are essentially in a single unity, what we now have is unconditioned absolute universality, and consciousness here for the first time truly enters the realm of the Understanding."
So if we are to understand the unconditioned universal, that paragraph seems like the place to look, but I can't make much sense of it. It seems that since "conditioned" universality has to do with the senses, unconditioned universality must be non-sensuous. And this unconditioned universality somehow comes about by recognizing that being-for-self and being-for-another are part of a unity...
Wait, that makes sense, I think. Unconditioned means that we aren't making a distinction between "for self" and "for another," and thus we are unifying the in-itself and the for-us under one universal.
Any ideas? I kind of thought out loud, so I apologize if this post seemed disorganized.
Sunday, September 13, 2009
Moments of Clarity
Are the best (no matter how quickly you fall back into frustration). I thought I would bring up a couple things:
1. Should we forget the idea of meeting once a week? I know work schedules are unpredictable and it is difficult to find a good time for everyone. We can simply get together to talk in smaller groups whenever it strikes us as convenient. On the other hand, the more time we have to discuss Hegel the better, and not having a crutch (Mr. Davis) may be a good thing. Let me know what you all think.
2. I think it is worth bringing up the question of changing our future reading schedule. I suspect that I am not alone in wanting to maximize Hegel study time even if that means reducing other readings. But I don't assume that everyone feels that way. I don't know if Mr. Davis feels that to be out of the question, but I do have a feeling that he would crack under the pressure of a democratic concensus. Again, let me (and everyone else) know what you think.
1. Should we forget the idea of meeting once a week? I know work schedules are unpredictable and it is difficult to find a good time for everyone. We can simply get together to talk in smaller groups whenever it strikes us as convenient. On the other hand, the more time we have to discuss Hegel the better, and not having a crutch (Mr. Davis) may be a good thing. Let me know what you all think.
2. I think it is worth bringing up the question of changing our future reading schedule. I suspect that I am not alone in wanting to maximize Hegel study time even if that means reducing other readings. But I don't assume that everyone feels that way. I don't know if Mr. Davis feels that to be out of the question, but I do have a feeling that he would crack under the pressure of a democratic concensus. Again, let me (and everyone else) know what you think.
Friday, September 11, 2009
Sense-Certainty
I'm still a little uncertain of what sense-certainty can be, and I was wondering what any of you might have to say.
My original understanding was that sense-certainty is the immediate and instantaneous awareness of sensual experience. In other words, sense-certainty consists of all the sensual data available (sight, sound, smell, taste, touch) at a particular time t. But this can't be right, because some (if not all) of our senses exist in time and not at a particular moment. I am thinking particularly of sound; sound is vibration and thus does not exist in any particular now, and cannot be included in the sensual data available at any time t. I suspect touch operates much the same way, and perhaps the other three, depending on how one looks at them. At any rate, sense-certainty cannot be aggregated sense-data (or something to that effect) at a particular time because sense-data can't be produced in a single moment.
My next guess is that sense-certainty is not any particular kind of sensation, but maybe only our ability to have conscious experience of sensation. Of course, that might be Hegel's point in the first place.
Any thoughts?
My original understanding was that sense-certainty is the immediate and instantaneous awareness of sensual experience. In other words, sense-certainty consists of all the sensual data available (sight, sound, smell, taste, touch) at a particular time t. But this can't be right, because some (if not all) of our senses exist in time and not at a particular moment. I am thinking particularly of sound; sound is vibration and thus does not exist in any particular now, and cannot be included in the sensual data available at any time t. I suspect touch operates much the same way, and perhaps the other three, depending on how one looks at them. At any rate, sense-certainty cannot be aggregated sense-data (or something to that effect) at a particular time because sense-data can't be produced in a single moment.
My next guess is that sense-certainty is not any particular kind of sensation, but maybe only our ability to have conscious experience of sensation. Of course, that might be Hegel's point in the first place.
Any thoughts?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)